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with  an  Incomes  Policy 
THE  TERM  "INCOMES  POLICY"  refers to a wide range of government 
measures for coping with what has been a major dilemma of western mar- 
ket economies in the post-World War  II period-the  need to reconcile a 
politically acceptable minimal rate of unemployment with a politically ac- 
ceptable minimal rate of inflation. These policies have developed out of 
growing disillusionment with the ability of aggregate  demand management, 
through traditional fiscal-monetary policy, to  provide acceptable perfor- 
mance in both areas simultaneously. The incomes policies used have ranged 
from limited attempts to  improve the functioning of individual markets 
through relatively mild voluntary programs (such as the wage and price 
guidelines that were introduced in the early 1960s in the United States) to 
complete government control of all wages and prices, such as has been ap- 
plied during wartime. 
European governments have generally been far more willing than has the 
United States to experiment with various kinds of incomes policies. But 
these experiments have had, at best, ambiguous results. Any general con- 
clusion about their effectiveness is difficult because their objectives, the 
environment in which they were tried, and the formal arrangements have 
all varied widely.' 
I.  A general  discussion of the experience  of major European  countries  is presented 
in Lloyd  Ulman  and Robert J. Flanagan,  Warige  Restraint: A Stutdy of hIicomiies  Policies 
in Western Europe  (Berkeley: University  of California  Press, 1971).  A detailed exami- 
nation of recent British  experience  is given in Allan Fels, The  British  Prices ntd  Inicomes 
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With the introduction of its new economic policy in August  1971, the 
United States embarked on its own adventure with a major program for 
wage and price controls. Following the freeze that was in effect for three 
months, the new economic policy moved into its second phase of controlled 
increases in wages and prices. This paper focuses on the "Phase II" period 
-particularly  on the form of the price and wage regulations, their effective- 
ness in slowing the overall rate of inflation, and their impact on other eco- 
nomic goals. 
The wage and price controls were adopted after a series of earlier mea- 
sures, undertaken  in an effort to restrain  inflation in the years 1969-71, had 
swollen the ranks of the unemployed by over two million persons, had re- 
inforced inequities in the distribution of income, and had cost the nation 
over $150 billion in lost output. In evaluating this or any other incomes 
program, problems, inefficiencies, and inequities certainly will be found; 
but they must be contrasted with those that would have existed without the 
program or with an alternative. The state of the economy over the last few 
years clearly shows that Phase I1 of the new economic policy did not replace 
an economic utopia. 
The first part of this paper summarizes briefly  the behavior of wages and 
prices up to the beginning of Phase 1I. The second outlines the structure of 
the control program and its major regulations. The third focuses on its im- 
pact as measured  by the major price and wage indexes. The paper concludes 
with a more subjective discussion of some of the problems and issues that 
have developed during the time the program has been in operation. 
Prelude to Controls 
The years prior to the freeze and Phase II bear ample witness that price 
and wage controls were not viewed as a first line of defense against infla- 
tionary pressures. In fact, the government showed remarkable  forbearance 
in exhausting most of the traditional alternatives. 
Board  (London: Cambridge  University  Press,  1972).  See also Organisation  for Economic 
Co-operation  and Development,  IJ%/Uoltion:  The Present Problem, Report by the Secretary 
General  (Paris: OECD, 1970),  for review  of some countries  that are not covered  in the 
Ulman and Flanagan  book. Bacrry  Boswort/h  345 
THE  1960-65  PERIOD  OF  PRICE  STABILITY 
The early 1960s still stand out as a time of remarkable price stability. 
The consumer price index (CPI) advanced at the rate of 1.3 percent a year 
from 1960 to 1965, with most of the increase occurring in the service sector 
-an  area of particularly  low productivity growth. (See Table 1.)2 Nonfood 
commodity prices rose at an average rate of 0.5 percent, and prices of du- 
rable goods actually declined. Wholesale prices rose by only 0.3 percent a 
year, with the industrial component remuaining  nearly constant from 1959 
to the end of 1964. Food and consumler  goods prices increased more rapidly 
in the CPI than in the wholesale price index (WPI), reflecting the low rate 
of productivity growth in trade and transportation.3 
Wage increases were also quite moderate during the early 1960s, as is 
shown in Table 2. Two major measures of wage costs are available at the 
level of the aggregate private nonfarm economy-total  compensation per 
manhour and a fixed-weight earnings index. While the series on total com- 
pensation per manhour is an adequate long-termii  measure of wage costs, it 
is quite erratic in the short run, perhaps because it draws on two different 
sources for data on compensation and on manhours.4 Differences in com- 
putation procedures, the inclusion of overtime pay, and cyclical changes in 
the distribution of employment between high- and low-wage industries are 
major contributors to  the  observed short-run variability. The earnings 
series differs in that it excludes fringe benefits and the income of nonpro- 
2. The noniood componenits  of the consuLmer  price index have been adjusted to 
eliminate  the influenice  of mortgage  initerest  rates, used car prices,  and the auto excise 
tax reduction,  and all the indexes  are seasonially  adjusted  except services  and renit,  which 
have  no significanit  seasonal  variationi.  Interest  rates  and used  car prices  have  substantial 
short-ruLn  fluctuationis  that at times distort the underlyinig  iniflation  trends.  The meth- 
odology used for these adjustmenlts was not as detailed as that used by the Bureau  of 
Labor  Statistics.  The two components  were treated  as part  of a fixed-weight  index, with 
relative  importance  for December 1971 as weights. However,  any biases should be of 
minor importance  for the period studied.  This adjustment  is not of significance  in the 
1960-65  period  but  does affect  the interpretation  of later  price  movements.  The aggregate 
CPI index showin in Table I is the same as that published by the Bureau of  Labor 
Statistics. 
3. A study of productivity  trends in the trade and service sectors can be found in 
Victor R.  Fuchs and Jean A.  Wilburn,  Procluctivity Diffrrences  Wit/iti  the  Service 
Sector, Occasional Paaper  102 (Columbia University  Press for the National Bureau  of 
Economic  Research, 1967). 
4. The compensation  data are from the U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of 
Economic  Analysis, anid  the manhours  data are from the Bureau  of Labor Statistics. N  '-  o)  N  -  tn  -  CN 
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duction workers and is a fixed-weight index, which reduces the importance 
of interindustry  employment shifts and variations in overtime within manu- 
facturing. 
Employee compensation per manhour in the private nonfarm sector grew 
at an average annual rate of 3.8 percent from 1960 to  1965. Since this ex- 
ceeded only slightly the rate of increase in output per manhour, unit labor 
costs were relatively  stable. Average hourly earnings of production workers 
grew less rapidly than the total hourly compensation of all employees, re- 
flecting partly a rapid rise in fringe benefits, as well as an apparently higher 
rate of wage or salary increase for nonproduction workers. Wages of gov- 
ernment employees rose sonmewhat  faster than those in the private sector. 
Various hypotheses have been put forth to  explain the favorable per- 
formance of prices and wages during this period, in which the unemploy- 
ment rate declined steadily from a high of 7 percent in May 1961 to 4 per- 
cent by the end of 1965.5  Several studies have found that the wage and price 
guideposts played a significant role. Others have emphasized the shifts in 
the composition of the labor force, especially the high level of "disguised 
unemployment" of women and teenagers. Still other studies infer that the 
tradeoff between inflation and unemploymiient  becomes steep only when the 
unemployment rate is in the 4 to 4.5 percent range and is subject to sub- 
stantial time lags. On this view, the initial stability of prices and high level of 
unemployment produced a noninflationary period that could not last at a 
maintained low rate of unemployment. In any case a single experience can- 
not provide a basis for choosing among all of these hypotheses, and a full 
explanation is complicated by the fact that there is probably some truth in 
all of theml. 
OUTBREAK  OF  INFLATION 
More rapid price increases became evident in late 1965 and in 1966. The 
sharp increase  in defense spending for the Vietnam war in 1965  strengthened 
5.  For an introdLuction  to this literature  and a bibliograp,hy  see Robert J. Gordon, 
"Iniflation in Recession and Recovery,"  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1 :1971), 
pp. 105-58; George L. Perry, "Chaniginig  Labor Markets  and Inflation,"  Brookintgs 
Papers  on Economic  Activity  (3:1970), pp. 411-41; and George L. Perry,  "Wages  and tlle 
Guideposts," Amvericatn Economic  Review, Vol. 57 (September  1967), pp. 897-904. A 
detailed discussion of the guidepost experience  is given in Jolhn  Sheallan, Tlle Wage- 
Price Guid(eposts  (Brookings  Institution,  1967).  See also George P. Shultz  and Robert  Z. 
Aliber (eds.), Gui(le/inies,  In/lbrmnal Conitrols, and(l  te  Mairket Place:  Policy  Choices il  a 
Fuill  Emplojyment  Economyj  (University  of Chiicago Press, 1966). 350  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
demand pressures  just as the rate of unemployment reached 4 percent. In 
addition, farm prices increased sharply, thus intensifying the concern of 
workers with their real incomes. War-related demands on individual sec- 
tors led to relatively large price increases for some commodities, such as 
raw materials and equipment. Medical care prices were a major source of 
acceleration in the services sector, perhaps as the result of a sharp spurt in 
demand for medical services following the introduction of medicare with- 
out the provision of adequate new resources to meet this demand. 
By the middle of 1966, with the settlement of the airline machinists' con- 
tract, the guideposts had become largely ineffectual in restraining wage in- 
creases. Manufacturing wage adjustments, which had been particularly 
moderate in the earlier period, rose sharply during 1966, and most of the 
major wage indexes showed significant acceleration. 
Wages and prices rose less rapidly during the mini-recession of 1967 but 
surged upward in all segments of the economy with the renewal of rapid 
demand growth in late 1967 and 1968. 
A combination of monetary and fiscal restraint sharply reduced the rate 
of expansion and pushed the economy into recession by the end of  1969. 
The growth rate of real gross national product (GNP) slowed from 5.8 per- 
cent between the first and third quarters of 1968 to 3.8 percent in the next 
two quarters  and actually became negative over the following four quarters. 
The unemployment rate rose from 3.3 percent in late 1968 to over 4 percent 
in early 1970 and soared to 6 percent by the end of the year. 
Stabilization policies clearly did influence economic activity, but wages 
and  prices failed to  respond to  the  deceleration of  aggregate demand 
growth. As is reflected in all of the major components of the CPI and WPI, 
the rate of inflation in prices continued to rise across the board in 1969 and 
1970. The major wage indexes given in Table 2 also show acceleration, 
especially in the collective bargaining area, in the face of a very substantial 
increase in unemployment. The pressure of large wage increases on prices 
was intensified by the very weak performance of labor productivity in both 
1969 and 1970. Output per manhour in the private nonfarm sector actually 
declined in 1969 and increased by only 0.6 percent in 1970, in contrast with 
the postwar average annual growth rate of nearly 3 percent. 
The behavior of the CPI in early 1971 provided some grounds for op- 
timism. It rose at an annual rate of 3.8 percent in the eight months prior to 
the August 1971 freeze, down from 5.9 percent in 1970. However, a closer 
examination of the data reveals some of the reasons why this performance Barry  Bosworth  351 
did not satisfy the administration in August. A large decline in mortgage 
interest rates, in response to an easier monetary policy, accounted for a 
significant portion of the supposed improvement. In addition, the August 
index was lowered by the removal of the automobile excise tax. Thus the 
adjusted index of nonfood items (excluding the effects of mortgage interest 
rates, used car prices, and the removal of the automobile excise tax) con- 
tinued to rise at a 5 percent rate, although it slowed down somewhat from 
its 1970 pace in both the commodity and service components. Because of a 
substantial rise in the price of intermediate goods, the outlook for whole- 
sale prices also was clouded. 
The behavior of wage rates raised even more doubt that an end to infla- 
tion was in sight. A sharp cyclical upturn in productivity did produce a 
marked slowdown in the rise of unit labor costs, but hourly compensation 
and earnings accelerated in most major categories. The negotiated wage 
increases abated slightly, almost entirely as a result of the reduction of 
construction settlements after their extraordinary 17.6 percent advance in 
1970. 
It is hard to explain the persistence of inflation in the 1969-71 period in 
the face of a major decline in the rate of overall resource utilization. Partial 
explanations have been proposed by others. Statistical equations, such as 
those of George L. Perry and Robert J. Gordon,6 may improve our under- 
standing of the change in wage behavior between the first half and the last 
half of the 1960s, but they do little to explain the persistence of large wage 
increases in 1970 and 1971. Despite the secular changes in the age and sex 
composition of the labor force, labor markets became much easier in 1970 
by whatever measure is used. 
Inflationary expectations may have played a part, but to have offset the 
large change in unemployment they would have had to become effective 
coincidentally with the 1970 recession. The statistical work in this area is 
marred by the  strong two-way  causation between prices and wages. If 
wages increase abnormally for any reason, they soon boost prices, and the 
direction of  causality can easily become obscured. Inflationary expecta- 
tions are sometimes invoked as an explanation in a residual category of 
hypotheses sweepingly applied to those episodes that are not fully under- 
stood. 
The basic difficulty  in choosing among possible explanations of observed 
6. See Robert  J. Gordon, "Wage-Price  Controls  and the Shifting Phillips  Curve,"  in 
lthis  volume. 352  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
wage and price behavior is the unique nature of each of the inflationary 
episodes. The postwar data for the United States do not offer much repeti- 
tion of market conditions, particularly  in the labor market. Despite the use 
of quarterly data the degrees of freedom for meaningful statistical analysis 
are limited to at most five or six relatively independent episodes. 
A concern with relative wages rather than real wages may have been a 
major element in the stubbornness of inflation from 1969 through 1971. 
Individuals may not be acutely aware of the magnitude of increases in the 
average price of the goods they buy, but they are well informed about the 
wages of other groups with whom they feel competitive. Recent wage set- 
tlements in related industries  serve as basic starting points for current nego- 
tiations. When wages accelerate in response to demand pressures or other 
factors in one industry, a general round of wage increases may be triggered 
off as other industries  seek to restore what they regard as the correct relative 
wage structure. Union members in particular may use such settlements as 
criteria for judging the performance  of their leaders at the bargaining  table. 
Management's standard for an acceptable settlement is also likely to be 
strongly conditioned by earlier settlements in other industries. The goal is 
not to defeat the union or break a strike, but rather  to achieve a wage settle- 
ment that is not out of line with what competitors are likely to grant and 
that does not result in extreme worker dissatisfaction. 
This kind of informal tandem bargaining  is quite evident in several of the 
major union contracts. Settlement terms in aluminum, cans, and steel were 
notably similar, as were those in automobiles, farm implements, and the 
aerospace industry. This concern with relative wage positions, together 
with increased use of multiyear contracts, extends the rounds of wage in- 
creases far beyond the period of original stimulus; for example, wage rate 
increases for the major unions fell behind in the 1965-68 period, thus creat- 
ing pressures for larger subsequent increases. 
The emphasis on wage rounds and relative wage positions in empirical 
work has not advanced far beyond the study published by Eckstein and 
Wilson in 1962,7 partly because such hypotheses are not readily amenable 
to popular statistical techniques, such as regression  analysis. But the Phillips 
curve approach, which relates inflation to resource utilization, also did not 
serve policy makers or forecasters well. 
7. Otto Eckstein  and Thomas A. Wilson, "The Determination  of Mooney  Wages in 
American  Industry,"  Quairterly  Jouirnial  of Ecotiomics, Vol. 76 (August 1962), pp. 379- 
414. Barry Bosworth  353 
Most economic forecasts consistently underpredicted  the magnitude of 
price and wage increases  that occurred  during the years 1969-71. Reflecting 
the same convictions, administration economists stuck with their "game 
plan" of applying restrictive  stabilization policies as a cure for the inflation, 
giving these policies two and a half years to produce some evidence of suc- 
cess. U.S. economists appear to have placed too much faith in depressing 
resource utilization as a means of curbing inflation in highly institutional- 
ized market economies, such as are found in the developed western coun- 
tries. If that lesson is properly read, the experience in the years 1969-71 
should show that there are no simple explanations for complex economic 
behavior and no easy solutions to the problems. 
FREEZE  PERIOD 
The administration  finally abandoned the game plan in August 1971 and 
imposed a broad ninety-day freeze on wages and prices. This provided time 
for developing a control program, without the risk of price and wage rises 
under the pressure of rumors and inside information. It also prevented the 
kind of inequities that developed in late 1950 as a prelude to the Korean 
war controls, when sharp increases in prices occurred in anticipation of 
controls  and particularly harmed union workers and businessmen who 
were locked into long-term contracts. Some contracts were reopened dur- 
ing the Korean war but this was not done on a consistent basis. 
A freeze that continues for any significant time does place a burden on 
labor since the increased productivity of labor leads to higher profits rather 
than higher wages. Moreover, a freeze hurts those who had earlier con- 
tracted for price and wage increases. If these were allowed, however, it 
would complicate the freeze program since price relief would have to be 
granted to firms that experienced major contractual increases in their costs 
and wage relief to  nonunion workers who would have received wage in- 
creases during the period on the basis of traditional practice. The adminis- 
trators were already strained to develop machinery to administer the re- 
cent freeze and probably could not have handled any more complex prob- 
lems. 
In stopping the rise in wages and prices, the freeze was quite successful. 
Most of the observed rise in the CPI was brought about by rises in exempt 
areas, such as food and taxes. An examination of the available monthly 
data on wages strongly supports the impression that the freeze was also 354  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
almost fully effective on the wage side, even though that is not clear from 
the quarterly  data in Table 2, which do not strictly isolate the freeze period. 
Furthermore,  the compensation data in the table include subsequent retro- 
active payments of wage increases already scheduled to become effective 
during the time of the freeze, and earnings data reflect fluctuations in over- 
time. 
Organizational  Structure  and  Regulations 
Phase II followed the freeze, beginning in mid-November 1971. General 
administrative  control of the Phase II program lies with the Cost of Living 
Council. The council has the responsibility of specifying which economic 
units are to be subject to the controls, classifying these units with respect 
to prenotification  and reporting,  and supervising  the Treasury  Department's 
Internal Revenue Service in its operation of the local service and com- 
pliance centers. 
A three-tier system of controls has been set up by the council. All tiers 
are subject to the same standards but differ in the degree of reporting re- 
quired. The first, which includes the largest firms and employee bargaining 
units (employee units with 5,000 or more workers, and companies with 
sales of $100 million and over), is required  to obtain prior approval for wage 
and price adjustments. A second group, of smaller economic units (units 
with 1,000 to 5,000 workers, and companies with sales between $50 million 
and $100 million), is required to submit regular ex post reports of any ad- 
justments. A third group, of still smaller units, is not required  to submit re- 
ports but is subject to the standards for category I and II units and may be 
audited. In addition, substantial elements of the economy have been ex- 
empted from the controls, among them, raw food products, small firms and 
employee units, low-wage employees, home purchases, used products, and 
small rental units. 
The significant price and wage decisions are made by the Pay Board and 
the Price Commission. In addition, there are several ancillary committees, 
including a Committee on Interest and Dividends, and two special advisory 
committees-the  Health Service Industry Committee and the Committee 
on State and Local Government Cooperation. Barry Bosworth  355 
THE  PAY  BOARD 
The Pay Board was originally composed of fifteen members, with equal 
representation of labor, business, and the public. As might have been ex- 
pected, the initial meetings of such a diverse group were not conducted in an 
atmosphere of  great amiability; nonetheless the  board emerged with a 
workable program and the cooperation, if not the enthusiastic support, of 
the labor faction. The dominant issues at these earlier meetings concerned a 
general standard for new contracts, the treatment of deferred increases un- 
der agreements signed prior to the controls, and the disposition of retroac- 
tive payments of wage increases held up by the freeze. 
General standard. The standard for new contracts was particularly sig- 
nificant in that all three parties were in agreement that overall wage in- 
creases should be based on the trend  in productivity of the overall economy 
and on prospective increases in the cost of living. Except for the inclusion of 
cost-of-living increases, this was the basic concept underlying  the guidelines 
of the early 1960s. The standard reflected the trend rather than cyclical 
productivity and, most important, it was based on an economy-wide rather 
than an industry-specific  productivity figure.8 
The 5.5 percent limit on new wage contracts set by the Pay Board re- 
flected a target rate of inflation of 2.5 percent and an estimated 3 percent 
for the long-run rate of increase in productivity. This general standard was 
qualified for two major reasons: to reflect historical tandem wage relation- 
ships and to allow a catchup for multiyear contracts that were signed prior 
to 1969. The intent of the tandem exception was to provide a link with pre- 
control wage increments where the introduction of the wage freeze caught 
some industries (such as steel) halfway through the negotiating process, 
despite the fact that the basic key agreement had already been signed. 
Catchup. The catchup provision (now scheduled to expire in Novembei 
1972) was intended to allow an additional increase of up to 1.5 percent for 
employee units that had signed agreements in  1968 and earlier years in 
anticipation  of  moderate future wage  and  price increases. Since  these 
groups had not benefited from the subsequent explosive wage  increases, 
the deterioration of their relative wage position tended to distort relative 
8. The use of industry-specific  productivity  would result  in a substantial  widening  of 
wage differentials  between low-productivity  and high-productivity  industries  without 
reference  to the relative  supplies  of labor. 356  Brookings Paipers  on Economic Activity, 2.1972 
labor market conditions. The catchup was computed as the difference be- 
tween 7 percent, the economy-wide average wage increase in the previous 
three years, and the annual average wage increase received under the old 
contract. Further, the catchup was limited to  no more than 1.5 percent, 
thus making the maximum possible wage increase 7 percent  (the sum of the 
5.5 percent basic standard and the maximum 1.5 percent catchup). 
The catchup provision was substantially broadened later when it was 
made applicable to wage agreements other than multiyear contracts. These 
included previous one-year union settlements and the wages of nonunion 
workers, even though the pay of these workers had not been restrained by 
a prior contract during the earlier inflation. With this new interpretation, 
eligibility for a 7 percent increase was extended to nearly one-half of all 
wage earners instead of the relatively small number covered by multiyear 
contracts that expired in 1972. In June 1972 the board acted to restrict the 
catchup provision to employee units with an average straight-time wage 
rate of less than $3.00 an hour and thus reduced the number of workers 
eligible for the catchup provision to 20 to 25 percent of the work force. 
However, since the board reviews contracts only after negotiations between 
the employees and employers are completed, this is not an estimate of the 
number of workers who will receive a wage increase above the basic stan- 
dard: They must first obtain one from their employers. 
Deferred inicreases.  Deferring increases under existing contracts raised a 
significant issue in that  it  meant invalidating legal contracts that  were 
signed before the controls were instituted. Unions  have fought long and 
bitter battles in the not so distant past to establish their right to negotiate 
collective agreements and to represent and protect the interests of employ- 
ees. Because unions have respected the binding nature of these contracts, 
the United States has been largely free of the wildcat strikes and failure to 
comply with the terms of agreements that have plagued other countries 
-the  United Kingdom, for example. The unions stressed the view that, 
since multiyear contracts may involve the surrender of some interests by 
the union early in the contract period in exchange for later wage increases, 
to reduce or eliminate these increases without considering the rest of the 
contract would be inequitable. 
The sanctity of existing contracts was preserved  by a change in emphasis 
that was principally semantic. Existing contracts were viewed as valid and 
allowed to take effect subject to a specific challenge by a subgroup of the 
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quirement of prior notification and approval for new contracts. There ap- 
pears to have been an implicit understanding that the standard for these 
challenges would not be lower than that for new contracts and rarely  would 
affect contracts providing less than a 7 percent increase. In recent months 
the board's treatment of deferred increases has moved closer to that for 
new contracts, with a requirement  for prenotification in categories I (firms 
with 5,000 or more employees) and 11  (1,000 to 5,000 employees), and an 
automatic challenge and review of increases of more than 7 percent. 
The issue of the retroactive payment of wage increases held up by the 
freeze was regarded by all parties as a matter of principle, on which there 
could be no compromise. Labor insisted that it must be paid, while the 
public and business members strongly opposed this view. The question of 
the retroactive payments, despite their minor economic significance (about 
$1 billion), remained a major source of friction within the board until Con- 
gress ordered their payment. 
The  stabilization act that was finally approved by Congress required 
several significant modifications in the  Pay  Board rules. First,  the  act 
exempted from the controls several major fringe programs, such as private 
pension plans, profit sharing, and group insurance programs. While the 
rationale for this is difficult to  interpret, it may reflect the legislative in- 
fluence of certain interest groups, such as insurance  companies. The exemp- 
tion was qualified by a limitation on increases that were "unreasonably in- 
consistent." When  the Pay Board applied a numerical  definition to this term, 
the exemption had the effect of raising the basic 5.5 percent standard to 6.2 
percent. 
Second, Congress exempted the "working poor" from wage controls, 
which raised a problem of  definition. Are the working poor those with 
minimiium  adequate budgets or those at the poverty level? Furthermore,  the 
need to translate a family's income into that of a single worker created dif- 
ficulties. The Cost of Living Council saw the dividing line as $1.90 an hour 
-the  administration's proposed minimum wage. This position was later 
overturned by a court ruling that it did not reflect the intent of Congress. 
The current figure is $2.75 an hour. 
Finally the Economic Stabilization Act required  the board to permit ex- 
ceptions to the general standard in the case of agreements that reflected 
direct increases in employee productivity  (such as incentive pay plans). The 
board has also made some exceptions to the general standard when the 
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THE  CONSTRUCTION  INDUSTRY  STABILIZATION  COMMITTEE 
The Construction Industry Stabilization Committee (CISC) was estab- 
lished before the Pay Board, but since the beginning of Phase II it has con- 
tinued to operate under the delegated authority of the board. Unlike the 
Pay Board, the committee continues to  be a tripartite organization. Its 
jurisdiction was limited initially to increases under new contracts, and it 
had no clear authority to hold up deferred wage increases. A general stan- 
dard of 6 percent for new contracts was applied, but frequent use has been 
made of its exceptions provisions.'3  These exceptions raised average settle- 
ments to  13.4 percent in early 1971. 
Since the beginning of Phase 1I, the committee has operated within the 
framework of the general pay standards, with power to limit new increases 
and to challenge all deferred increases. It also has considerable latitude in 
applying the regulations to individual cases, its basic commitment being to 
bring the average increase in construction wages back into line with that of 
the rest of the economy. 
The explosion of construction wage rates in earlier years had seriously 
distorted relative wage structures, and rates for the same job varied widely 
among local areas. Pay in skilled  jobs occasionally was less than that in un- 
skilled ones if the former was limited by a long-term contract. Thus the 
catchup problem was greater in the construction industry than elsewhere. 
The committee has tried to restore historical wage differentials  and to create 
a greater degree of homogeneity of wage rates for similar jobs, on both a 
regional and a national basis. 
THE  PRICE  COMMISSION 
The Price Commission has seven members. While no attempt was made 
to represent all areas of interest, several of the members have substantial 
prior business experience. The commission established a set of rules that 
differ for major sectors of the economy but that were designed to hold the 
rate of inflation to 2.5 percent or less by the end of 1972. Specific regulations 
were adopted for trade, manufacturing and services, public utilities, rental 
units, and health services. The basic approach adopted by the commission 
was to  control prices indirectly by controlling profit margins on  an in- 
9. The operation of the CISC has been discussed in greater  detail in Albert Rees, 
"The Construction Industry Stabilization Committee: Implications for  Phase II," 
Brookitigs Papers otn  Econiomic Activity (3:1971),  pp. 760-65. Barry Bosworth  359 
dividual firm-by-firm  basis. The primary regulation allowed for the pass- 
through of costs, but these costs were defined to include everything except 
profits. 
The commission has also applied a general rule requiring firms that re- 
ceive price increases to maintain a profit margin per dollar of sales that is 
below the average of the highest two out of three fiscal years prior to the 
control program.  The base profit margin for most firms is that for 1968-69. 
This rule was intended initially as a second "line of defense" after the cost 
pass-through  standard and other more specific regulations. However, these 
detailed regulations have been difficult  to implement, and increasing stress 
has been placed on controlling the profit margin. 
Wholesale  and retail trade. Price control regulations for wholesale and 
retail trade require firms to maintain a percentage gross markup over in- 
voice cost that is no higher than that of the freeze period. Thus only in- 
creases in the cost of goods to the firm can serve as a basis for an increase 
in the price at which it sells them. The regulation does not allow for any 
increase in gross margins to  reflect higher operating costs  in the  trade 
sector. Since the growth in productivity of the trade sector is less than that 
of the rest of the economy, while its rate of wage increase approximately 
matches the economy-wide average, the gross markup would normally be 
expected to rise in the long run. Thus the present regulation does have an 
extra degree of restraint beyond a cost justification of price increases. 
The regulation is clear, and it is easy for firms to comply with it since it 
follows the line of their normal pricing procedures. However, the loose 
definition of the "normal margin" and shifts in product mix complicate its 
enforcement. It is not clear that a controls program should concentrate on 
the trade sector, which is considered to be quite competitive. The commis- 
sion does focus on the large retailers and exempts those with fewer than 
sixty employees. The posting of base period prices for major sale items 
caused some confusion initially since it had no relationship to the basic 
regulation, which refers to markups and not prices. But this requirement 
is of little current importance. 
Manufacturing  and servicefirms. The regulation for the industrial sector 
is far more detailed, with an allowance for a percentage pass-through of all 
cost increases-costs  being revenue less operating profits, as narrowly de- 
fined. These allowable cost increases are divided into four categories: unit 
labor costs adjusted for prospective productivity increases, unit material 
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Initially the commission allowed firms to  use their own estimates of 
productivity improvement, but  this  penalized firms that  had  achieved 
large gains in productivity,  either through efficient management or through 
labor-saving investment. Moreover, it resulted in abnormally low estimates 
of future increases in productivity by firms that were asking for price in- 
creases. The commission now applies industry-wide productivity estimates 
to  individual firms, using trend estimates rather than  the  above-trend 
growth associated with the present cyclical upswing. In applying for a price 
adjustment, individual firms still may estimate their own anticipated sales 
growth, which is important in determining the change in unit overhead 
costs. A low projected sales growth tends to raise the estimated increase in 
unit fixed costs. The initial period for measuring allowable cost increases 
was also changed from the date of the previous price rise to no earlier than 
January 1, 1971, in order to  curb price increases by firms that had not 
raised prices in several years. 
In an attempt to reduce the administrative load on multiproduct firms 
and on its own staff, the commission also entered into term limit pricing 
agreements (TLPs) with individual firms. Under these arrangements the 
firms  agreed to hold their average price increases  to 2 percent, but they were 
free to raise prices of individual products by any amount. After some ex- 
perience with the provision, the commission lowered the overall limit on 
TLPs to 1.8 percent and put a ceiling on any individual increase, first at 8 
percent and later at 6 percent. 
Regulated utilities. The commission essentially delegated authority in 
the utilities area to the existing regulatory agencies, but retained the power 
to review and modify their decisions. The regulatory agencies are expected 
to follow the general criteria that apply to other industries, but it seems 
probable that they will simply continue their past practices. The intent of 
this decision was to prevent dual controls and to free the commission to 
focus on other sectors. 
Health services. The regulations adopted for health services are some- 
what more stringent and direct than those in other areas. A 2.5 percent 
ceiling applies to all increases in doctors' and dentists' fees, and they must 
be justified by cost increases. Health institutions also must cost-justify their 
price increases, with increases in excess of 6 percent being allowed only if 
an exception is granted by the commission. 
Rent. The control of rental units is one of the most controversial areas 
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controls in this area because of their complexity and inequities and because 
of the basically competitive structure of the industry. The regulations do 
exempt about one-half of this market; and, where applied, the basic controls 
allow for a 2.5 percent increase for general costs, the pass-through of in- 
creases in taxes and charges for municipal services, and a recovery of the 
cost of capital improvements. 
Impact of the Controls 
Because the Phase II program has been in force for only a short time, it 
is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about its effectiveness. However, 
some tentative impressions can be reported concerning the impact of the 
program on the aggregate wage and price indexes. Most  of the relevant 
statistical data are shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
IMPACT  ON  WAGE  RATES 
Very few major union agreements are subject to  bargaining in  1972. 
Major contracts (those affecting 1,000 or more employees) for 2.8 million 
workers are coming up for renegotiation or reopening in 1972, compared 
with approximately 4.75  nmillion  in both  1970 and  1971. However, the 
largest of these occurred relatively early in the program, before many of 
the regulations were formalized. These included union agreements in the 
coal (in late  1971), aerospace, railroad, and longshoring industries. The 
rest of the year has been dominated by negotiations of relatively small or 
regional  unions,  most  notably  in  the  constructioni, trade, and  apparel 
industries. 
Because so many multiyear contracts were signed in 1970 and 1971, de- 
ferred  increases under  those contracts are an important element in the wage 
record of 1972. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics records, these de- 
ferred  increases  average  6.1 percent for the year, excluding escalator clauses, 
and cover 6.7 nmillion  workers under major labor contracts (those affecting 
1,000 or more workers). The largest are in construction (11.6  percent), 
transportation (9.5 percent), and trade (7.7 percent). Furthermore, about 
one-half of  the workers affected are covered by cost-of-living escalator 
clauses, the largest proportion recorded since such statistics were first com- 
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It is not a simple  matter  to price  out the impact  of these  escalator  clauses, 
since  they vary  greatly  in their  terms.  Many have guaranteed  minimums, 
which  were  included  in the 6.1 percent  figure,  or ceilings  set at the top. In 
addition,  the adjustment  usually  is less than 1 percent  of wages  for a 1 per- 
cent rise  in prices.  However,  a rough  judgment  can be made  by noting  that, 
if the CPI  rises  by 3 percent,  the average  deferred  increase  will  be 7 percent, 
rather  than  6.1 percent. 
Aggregate  wage  indexes.  The behavior  of the major  wage series  during 
the control  period  is shown  in Table  2. A bulge  in the magnitude  of wage 
increases  after November 14 reflects  the concentration  in late 1971 and 
early  1972  of increases  that  normally  would  have  gone  into effect  during  the 
freeze  period.  While  the earnings  series  excludes  any retroactive  lump-sum 
payments  resulting  from  the freeze,  the compensation  data  were  revised  on 
an ex post basis to include  these payments  as having  accrued  during  the 
freeze  period.  The  earnings  series  declines  more  in the fourth  quarter,  which 
includes  1.5 months  of the freeze,  and shows a greater  acceleration  in the 
first  quarter  of 1972.  Although  the monthly  data  are  more  erratic,  some of 
the bulge  effects  would  be removed  if the earnings  data  were  reported  on a 
December-to-March  basis.  The annual  rate of increase  would be 6.2 per- 
cent  for all industries,  as against  the 8.6 percent  shown  in the table,  and  5.7 
percent  versus  9.3 percent  for manufacturing. 
The second  quarter  of 1972  is the first  period  that reflects  the full impact 
of the controls.  The deceleration  during  that quarter  was quite  substantial 
in all sectors,  and the wage increases  came into line with the Pay Board 
standard  of 5.5 to 6 percent.  In contrast  with the rate of increase  before 
August  1971,  the annual  increments  appear  to have  been  reduced  by about 
1.5 to 2.0 percentage  points. The decline  is most notable  in the contract 
construction  industry,  although  the 4.8 figure  may be somewhat  transitory 
because  the wage  series  for this industry  is highly  erratic  in the short  run. 
Since  the difference  from  the  earnings  series  cannot  be  explained  by changes 
in fringe  benefits  or overtime,  the low 4.4 percent  figure  for  employee  com- 
pensation  appears  to reflect  some of the short-run  problems  of measure- 
ment  that were  discussed  above. 
Negotiated  wage settlements  run significantly  above average  earnings 
and  are  still above  the Pay  Board  target.  But  they  are  heavily  influenced  by 
the catchup  provisions,  the importance  of which  should  decline  in the fu- 
ture. In terms  of changes  from  the precontrol  period,  the results  are quite 
impressive.  The average  decline in first-year  adjustments  was from 10.1 Barry Bosworth  363 
percent  in the first  half of 1971,  to 8.4 percent  in the first  quarter  of 1972, 
and to 6.6 percent  in the second  quarter. 
The available  data indicate  that wage increases  have slowed  sharply  in 
the contract  construction  industry,  which  is under  the control  of the Con- 
struction  Industry  Stabilization  Committee.  The first-year  adjustment  of 
contracts  approved  in the second quarter  of 1972 averaged  6.4 percent, 
compared  with 13.4 percent  in the first half of 1971  and 17.6 percent  in 
1970.  The  low 4.8 percent  figure  for the increase  in average  hourly  earnings 
in the second quarter  may be somewhat  erratic  because  of problems  of 
seasonal  adjustment.  However,  the BLS  index  of building  trade  union  wage 
rates  increased  by 6.5 percent  in the year  ending  in June 1972,  as against 
11.4  percent  in 1971.  Because  of greater  problems  with a distorted  relative 
wage  structure,  the CISC  has relied  less than  the Pay Board  has on a gen- 
eral  standard.  A larger  proportion  of the contracts  have  been  altered  by the 
committee,  and individual  settlements  have shown wide variation.  The 
committee  has  also modified  a larger  number  of the deferred  increases. 
It is difficult  to measure  the precise  impact  of the  controls  in the construc- 
tion industry.  In some  areas  the union  rates  have  not been  paid  because  of 
increased  competition  from lower-wage  nonunion  workers.  The construc- 
tion trades  do not constitute  a completely  closed shop, and market  pres- 
sures  undoubtedly  had  some  influence  in slowing  the rate  of wage  increase. 
Pay Board  data. The Pay Board  issues  its own statistics  on its approvals 
for categories  I and II wage  adjustments,  in which  increases  averaged  4.9 
percent  through  June  1972.  Normally  the aggregate  figures  include  new  and 
deferred  adjustments  but do not distinguish  between  union  and nonunion 
workers.  This has  resulted  in some  confusion  in relating  Pay Board  data  to 
those of other  agencies,  such  as the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics.  The differ- 
ences  are  due primarily  to differences  in coverage  rather  than  in underlying 
data. 
A reconciliation  of the Pay Board  figures  for the first  six months  of 1972 
with  those  for negotiated  wage  settlements  as reported  by the BLS  is shown 
in Table 3. Categories  I and ll together  cover unions  of the same size as 
the BLS does-1,000  or more workers.  The Pay Board  approved  pay in- 
creases  that  averaged  4.8 percent  for 8.9 million  workers  during  the period. 
This average  was dominated  by deferred  increases,  nonunion  approvals, 
and  state  and  local  government  wage  decisions.  All of these  wage  approvals 
are  excluded  from  the BLS  data.  For the cases  that  are  reported  by both  the 
BLS  and the Pay Board,  there  appears  to be no significant  difference.  The 364  Brookings Pap)ers  on Economic Activity, 2.1972 
Table 3.  Reconciliation  of Pay Board and Bureau  of Labor Statistics Data 
on Wage Increases,  by Category, through  June 1972 
Weiglited av'erage  Numbnier  oJ 
wvaige  increase  employees 
Agen'cy cand  cldatai  item  (percenit)  (thousands) 
Pay Board, ccitegories I ciaid /la 
New  and deferred cases, excludinig retroactive 
November  14, 1971, througil Junlle  1972  4.9  9, 274 
First six months  1972  4.8  8,921 
New cases,  excluding  nlOnlUllioIn  anid goverinmental, 
adjusted for classification  anid timing used by 
BLS 
First six months  1972  7.4  673 
Bureaui  oJ Labor Statistics 
Major private collective  bargaininig settlemenits, 
excluding construction 
First six months  1972  7.4  703 
Source:  Pay  Board  release  PB-I  14, July  28,  1972. 
a.  Firims with  1,000  or  miiore  emiiployees. 
small difference  in the number of cases involved can be traced to differences 
of classification of sonme  bargaining situations that appear to have applied 
to the Pay Board as category III cases. In effect, the BLS data can be used 
as a fully appropriate  measure  of Pay Board actions for new contract settle- 
ments for large unions in categories I and It. 
A more detailed view of the Pay Board's actions can be seen in Table 4, 
where a distinction is made between new and deferred adjustmllents  and be- 
tween union and nonunion settlements.  The data differ from those in Table 
3 since they include all approvals since November 1971 and wage approvals 
for governnment  workers. First, it is clear that most of the deceleration is 
concentrated in new agreements, which averaged 4.8 percent. Normally, 
new increases substantially exceed deferred ones, but the very low rate of 
increase for new nonunion adjustmiients  held down the average of total new 
adjustments to the rate of deferred increases. The uni1ioni  cases follow the 
traditional pattern, in which first-year adjustments (6.9  percent) exceed 
deferred increases (4.8 percent). 
The deferred union adjustments can be changed only by specific Pay 
Board action since they are not subject to the general standard. Also they 
are sometimes divided into two or more adjustments  within one year. Since 
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Table 4.  Average Percentage Increases  in Pay Packages Approved  by the 
Pay Board through  July 1, 1972, and Number  of Workers  Involved,  by Union 
Status and Type of Agreementa 
Type of 
New  Deferred  agreemelnt 
Untioni  statius  agreemenit agreementt  ulnkniowni  Total 
Un7iont 
Pay increase  (percent)  6.9  4.8  5. 5  5.1 
Number  of workers  (thousands)  718  4,776  24  5,519 
Nontiiiiolt 
Pay increase  (percent)  4.2  4.8  4. 3  4.4 
Number  of workers  (thousands)  2,518  759  32  3, 309 
Utnkntowni 
Pay increase  (percent)  4.8  5.9  1. 3  4.6 
Number  of workers  (tlhousands)  58  31  17  107 
All workers 
Pay increase  (percent)  4.8  4.8  3.9  4.8 
Number  of workers  (thousands)  3, 295  5,567  72  8,934 
Source: Pay Board, unpublished tabulation. The data exclude all retroactive pay increases arising out of 
the freeze period of Phase I. 
a.  Situations involving 1,000 or more workers. 
first of any two-part increase would go into effect without challenge. Thus 
the greatest opportunity for the Pay Board to reduce these increases would 
come relatively late in the year. Through August 1972 the board acted to 
reduce deferred increases affecting only 100,000 workers, putting its major 
focus on new contracts. 
The data clearly indicate that the 5.5 (or 6.2) percent guideline has not 
become a "floor" for nonunion settlements, as was feared by some.'0 The 
distribution of increases in large union settlements in 1971 and 1972, shown 
in Table 5, also suggests that the general standard does not serve as a mini- 
mum target since the proportion of  settlements below 5 percent has in- 
creased substantially, even though it is still not large. The major impact of 
the program has been to reduce the very large increases; settlements above 
9 percent are much rarer in 1972 than in 1971. A minor but predictable 
repercussion of the program is the shortening of the average length of the 
contracts from thirty-four to twenty-five months. But with the exception of 
10. The present  data for nonunion employees  may be biased downward  by the fact 
that some may receive two increases  during the year and the second would not yet be 
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Table 5.  Distribution  of Workers Affected  by Initial Year Changes in Union 
Wage Rates, First Half 1971 and First Half 1972 Decisionsa 
Percentiage  of workers afeted 
Amnount  ol  wvage  ra1te  First hal'  Fir-st  ha4lf 
increase  1971  1972 
Under 5 percent  2  10 
5 and Lunder  7 percent  27  32 
7 and under  9 percent  13  30 
9 and under 11 percent  29  18 
11 percent  and over  27  9 
Not specified  2  ... 
Total  100  100 
Sources: U.S.  Bureau of  Labor-  Statistics, "Major Collective Bargaining Settlemilenits,  First 6 Monthis 
1971,"  News Release USDL-71-416 (July 29, 1971),  Table 3, and ".  . . First 6 Moniths  1972," USDL-72-512 
(July 28, 1972), Taible  3. Per-centages  are rounded and miay  not add to 100. 
a.  Bargaining  agreements covering 1,000  or miloi-e  wor-kers. 
contract construction, this reduction is less pronounced than miglht have 
been anticipated. Contracts have some tendency to be more back-loaded 
than they were before the controls, but this is primarily the result of Pay 
Board reductions in the first-year  adjustments rather  than a conscious prior 
restructuring  by the parties at interest. There is also an increase in the fre- 
quency with which provisions are included for a wage reopening after one 
year or at the termination of the controls. There is little evidence of any 
efforts to alter normal contract provisions in order to avoid the regulations. 
A final gain associated with the program has been a general decline in the 
frequency and length of work stoppages during the control period. 
It is difficult to determine whether, under the controls, the small unions 
and the nonunion sector are receiving treatment equal to that of the larger, 
more powerful unions. Adequate data are not available on nonunion wages 
for the precontrol period. However, their average increase could not have 
been far below the economy-wide average since 75 percent of the work 
force is nonunion. Nonunion wages have increased by a smaller percentage, 
but this is the result also of several other factors. Multiyear contracts are 
more common among the larger unions and are typically front-loaded so 
that the first-year  increases exceed the later ones. Second, the problem of a 
catchup to  restore normal wage differentials is greatest where there are 
multiyear contracts. Frequently the increases received under the prior con- 
tract were not as great as those received by other workers in the 1969-71 
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Problems in this area, if they exist, will become more obvious as the econ- 
omy approaches full employment in future years, and we can more ade- 
quately judge differences in the availability of labor in different markets. 
Requests for exceptions from the general standard are less likely to come 
before the board in the case of nonunion workers, since the employer must 
first agree to a settlement above the board's general standard. However, 
most nonuniion  settlements are in category 111,  or they are exempt. Thus, 
unless the board gives the major unions larger increases than they would 
receive in the absence of controls, it is hard to see how the nonunion sector 
is worse off. 
IMPACT  ON  PRICES 
A significant slowing of inflation is evident in the behavior of most major 
price indexes. As was shown in the last column of Table 1, consumer prices 
have increased at an annual rate of 2.9 percent in the first eleven months of 
price controls, compared with a 3.8 percent rate prior to the freeze. The im- 
provement is even more evident in the adjusted index for nonfood items, 
which excludes used car prices and mortgage interest rates, and which has 
advanced at an annual rate of 2.7 percent, compared with 5.0 percent be- 
fore the controls. The deceleration of inflation is particularly  dramatic in 
the area of medical care services, where the Price Commission has resorted 
to the use of an upper limit on individual price increases. 
Aggr-egate  pi-ice  inldexes.  The nmeasurement  of price changes over the en- 
tire control  period averages several subperiods with quite different per- 
formances. The  freeze period of  low  inflation was  followed  by several 
months of substantial price rises. The commission allowed a catchup of 
prices similar to the wage catchup allowed by the Pay Board, and its atti- 
tude toward price increases was considerably easier early in the period than 
it was later on. In addition, food prices increased rapidly in the first few 
months of Phase 11.  These bulges are partially  offset by a sharp drop in used 
car prices in the immediate postfreeze period. Thus the period since March 
1972 offers a more realistic  picture of progress  made in slowing the inflation. 
After rising at a rate of nearly 4 percent between Novemlber  and March, 
the adjusted index for nonfood items has been increasing at an annual rate 
of 2.6 percent. Nonfood commilodity  prices rose in the recent period by 2.1 
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crease in service prices between March and July (3.9 percent) was about 
half of that in early 1971. 
Food  prices have been a continuing problem throughout the control 
period. Prices at the grocery store rose sharply in the immediate postfreeze 
period in response to increases in the wholesale prices of farm products. 
Food prices remained stable between March and June 1972 but have been 
rising rapidly in recent months. The increases reflect primarily  supply prob- 
lei-ns  and the fact that the economy is in the midst of a temporary cyclical 
upswing in farm prices. In general, manufacturers  and retailers are free to 
pass these cost increases on to the constimer. 
In view of the short-run rigidity of supply and the basic competitive na- 
ture of the food industry,  this is not normally a sector where controls would 
be emphasized. But such reasoning is of slight consolation to wage earners 
who are asked to adhere to a pay standard based on a target rate for overall 
inflation of 2.5 percent. A similar round of food price increases stimulated 
concern about inflation on the part of the public in late 1965  and early 1966. 
Thus the coincidental timing of Phase II controls with a major rise in food 
prices has reduced public confidence in the program. 
The wholesale price index does not present as favorable a picture of the 
trend of the inflation. Even if farm prices are ignored, the rate of price ad- 
vance for industrials was 4.4 percent between March and July-only  mar- 
ginally below the rate of early 1971. The increases were concentrated in the 
intermediate and crude materials components, with the former having by 
far the greatest relative weight in the overall index. Most of the intermedi- 
ate-goods-producing industries  showed significant price increases following 
the freeze, the largest being in leather products, lumber, and textiles, where 
the basic influences appear to be changes in demand or supply rather than 
any institutional cost-push factors. 
The higher prices of  intermediate goods  are not fully reflected in the 
prices of finished goods. While they show few signs of deceleration relative 
to the precontrol period, prices of conisumer  and producer goods have risen 
more slowly than the prices of intermediate  goods. It is somewhat unusual 
to find such a long lag between changes in the prices of intermediate  goods 
and of finished products, but this may be the result of delays faced by pro- 
ducers of finished goods in obtaining approval of price increases from the 
commnission.  Or it may be that they hesitate to request price increases. Also 
the strong upsurge in output during the first half of  1972, with the con- 
sequent spreading of overhead costs and large gains in productivity, may Barry  Bosivort/h  369 
make it easier for these producers to absorb the increases in the prices of 
materials. 
A  comparison of the CPI and the WPI for finished consumer goods 
shows the same pattern-a  greater reduction in the rate of increase for final 
products than for intermediate  goods. In earlier periods this component of 
the CPI increased more rapidly than the corresponding component of the 
WPI as a result of rising trade margins. But this has not been the case in the 
Phase 11 period. Despite some differences in the product composition of 
these indexes, the more pronounced deceleration of the CPI may reflect a 
slowing in the rate of increase in retail margins. This would be consistent 
with the Price Commission regulation by which trade sector firms must 
maintain a gross profit margin no higher than that of the freeze period. 
On the other hand, another factor may explain the observed differences 
between the rates of increase  in prices of intermediate  and of finished goods, 
and the lower rate of increase in the CPI components. The consumiier  price 
index is a miieasure  of prices paid for actual purchases. In contrast, the WPI 
is a mixture of realized and list prices. In the current atmosphere of uncer- 
tainty about future Price Commission policy, some firms are reported to be 
raising their list prices in order to establish a high base-period price as a 
protection against future changes in the regulations. The term limit pricing 
agreements seem particularly vulnerable to these list-price changes when 
there is no change in realized prices. The practice of discounting below list 
price is more common in intermediate goods than in finished goods and 
may imply that some of the increase in these components of the WPI does 
not represent  a real price change.1' 
The behavior of the fixed-weight private nonfarm deflator in the first two 
quarters of 1972 supports the view that there has been a significant decline 
in the rate of inflation. The second quarter rate of 2.3 percent is less than 
half the rate for the first six months of 1971.12 The slowing of price inflation 
on the whole mlatclhes  the 1.5-2 percentage point slowdown in wages but 
does not fully match the decline in unit labor costs, which reflected  a large 
gain in output per manhour.  Past statistical studies have clearly shown that 
II  A detailed  explanation  of tihe problem of  interpretinig the price indexes with re- 
spect to discouLnting  below list is given in George  J. Stigler and James K.  Kindalil, The 
Behavior  o/  lnhistrial  Prices (National  Bureau of  Economic  Research,  1970). 
12. The decline in the actual deflator to an anntual rate of  1.5 percent was eveni more 
pronouLnced,  but  it was hieavily influeniced by a slift  in the mix of output  toward goods 
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prices are more sensitive to short-run  changes in wage rates than in produc- 
tivity. Since much of the shortfall in productivity growth during the 1969- 
70 recession was reflected in lower profit margins, it is to be expected that 
the cyclical upswing in productivity  will not generate a commensurate price 
slowdown. 
Price Commission  data. It is difficult  to draw many conclusions from the 
program data of the Price Commission, partly because very little informa- 
tion of even the most general sort about these data is made public. It is also 
difficult to know how to interpret  the data that can be pieced together. 
The Price Commission's activities are of primary  importance in its deal- 
ings with the 1,500 Tier I firms, which account for over 30 percent of all 
industry sales. These firms must either receive prior approval for any price 
increases or enter into term limit pricing agreements. The proportion of the 
sales of  various industry sectors that is accounted for by these firms is 
shown in column 1 of Table 6. 
As  of mid-August 1972 the commission had made decisions on 4,741 
requests for price increases. Increases were granted in 93 percent of these 
cases and averaged 3.2 percent on applicable sales of $300 billion and 1.7 
percent on the total sales of the firms requesting increases. The size of the 
average price increase has been relatively constant during the course of 
Phase II. 
The figures do include about  190 term limit pricing agreements cover- 
ing $150 billion to  $175  billion  in  sales. The  agreements allow  for  an 
average price increase of about 2.2 percent on total sales. While the number 
of TLP agreements that have been ratified in recent months has continued 
to rise, the rate of increase has slowed, and most of the increases currently 
being granted come under the cost pass-through regulation. 
Some industry breakdown of the approved price increases is available 
from the Cost of Living Council quarterly report of June 1972. The pub- 
lished data shown in column 3 of Table 6 include TLPs, which I have 
attempted to remove in column 5. The TLP agreements all provide for in- 
creases of close to 2 percent. Thus total approvals averaged 3.1 percent, of 
which TLPs accounted for 2.2 percent on total sales, and the non-TLPs 4.2 
percent on applicable sales. Over 95 percent of the TLPs and 88 percent of 
the cost pass-through approvals were in the manufacturing sector. Tier I 
firms account for 67 percent of manufacturing  sales, and half of the firms in 
this category have received approvals for price increases. Two-thirds of 
these increases were TLPs averaging 2.4 percent, and the cost pass-through It)  r. 
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approvals averaged 3.8 percent. Increases in utilities and finance have been 
larger, but they are based on a small number of decisions. TLPs represent 
about 60 percent of all price increases approved through June 1972. 
One difficulty with these increases is that the extent to which they have 
been implemented is not known-nor  is the response of non-Tier-I firms in 
the markets where price increases were allowed. If these increases were put 
into effect and other firms matched them, the average increase of 3.8 per- 
cent for non-TLPs, representing about 20 percent of Tier I sales, would 
translate into an 0.8 percent rise in the manufacturing component of the 
WPI. But far more disaggregated data would be needed to make reliable 
calculations. It appears that not all of the TLP agreements have been fully 
implemiiented,  but no information is available to the public on the amount 
of price change or on the specific product lines in which they have occurred. 
The increases  seem large relative  to the target overall rate of 2.5 percent- 
particularly for the goods-producing industries, given their high produc- 
tivity growth. But of course the figures  do not include firms that received no 
increase. The margin between the 47 percent of Tier I firms at a 3.1 percent 
increase and the 53 percent at zero increase does seem rather wide. 
One final problem exists in comparing Price Commission approvals with 
observed changes in the WPI and CPI. Through the end of August 1972 the 
Price Commllission  had approved price increases for Tier I firms amllounting 
to $9.7 billion in annual revenue. Yet if the increase in the industrial com- 
ponent of the WPI is applied to the sales of Tier I firms,  the implied increase 
in revenue is 1.5 to 2 times as large. This conclusion holds even if the com- 
putations are done on a disaggregated basis. But in the explanation above 
of the rapid rate of increase in the WPI relative to the CPI, it was conjec- 
tured that these increases  might be in list prices  and might not reflect  changes 
in prices actually paid. Yet the list price is what firms usually report to the 
Price Commllission.  Thus, if the WPI increases reflect only increases in list 
prices, it would appear that either Tier I firms are not receiving  the same in- 
creases as other firms in their industry, or a substantial number of viola- 
tions are occurring. On the other hand, the substantial increases  in the WPI 
may reflect actual price changes. 
Price increases  for most public utilities are not included in the above data 
since their applications for rate adjustments  have been handled by the regu- 
latory agencies since March 1972. Initially the Price Commission tried to 
review each of these rate adjustments before they were put into effect. It 
soon became clear, however, that the agencies were going to allow a sub- Barry Boswortlh  373 
stantial number of large increases. Furthermore, the criteria established in 
the Price Commission's regulations did not match those of the regulatory 
agencies, and thus some confusion  resulted. To  solve this, after a one- 
month freeze, the regulatory agencies were given the authority to approve 
rate changes, after first obtaining the Price Commission's approval of their 
proposed rules for use in considering requests for price increases. Under 
the new procedures, firms in the regulated industries are not subject to 
profit margin control. Instead, the agencies are to be guided by a general 
criterion under which a rate increase may be approved if it is justified by 
costs, or if it is needed in order to cover the costs of future expansion or to 
attract capital. In addition, rate changes are not allowed for the purpose of 
covering wage increases above the 5.5 percent standard; and  unit labor 
costs must be adjusted to allow for anticipated growth in productivity. The 
general nature of these criteria implies that controls will probably have lit- 
tle impact on utility rates. 
Datathat  are available from one quarterly  review of utility rate increases 
during the control period show that in the second quarter  of 1972, increases 
averaging 7 percent were approved on about one-fourth of total telephone 
conmpany  sales.13  Rate adjustments  for gas and electricity averaged 6.4 per- 
cent on about one-third of industry sales. Increases in transportation aver- 
aged a much lower 1.6 percent on 10 percent of industry revenue. 
These increases  appear to be reflected  in both the CPI and the WPI. Tele- 
phone rates in the CPI rose at an annual rate of 4.7 percent between August 
1971 and July 1972. The rate of increase has been 4 percent since March 
1972. Electrical energy rates have increased at a rate of 4.6 percent for the 
full control period and 5.7 percent since March. Electric power prices in the 
WPI have increased at a rate of 6.5 percent since August 1971. 
The profit nmargin  restriction  became an increasingly  important, although 
not necessarily  effective, elenment  of restraint  as the program developed. Al- 
thouLgh  it was originally viewed as a secondary line of defense, it has begun 
to exceed in importance  the cost pass-through  regulation. The latter control 
has proved to be very complicated to administer,  and in practice it is flexible 
enough that most requests for price increases are found to meet its require- 
ments. 
On the basis of first quarter reports, 16 percent of 700 firms reporting in 
Tier I were above the profit ceiling. This does not include all of the Tier I 
firms since only those that raise their prices during Phase II are required  to 
13.  Cogstgiessiouclil Record, daily ed.,  Au1guIst 17, 1972, pp. SI 3843-45. 374  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
report. An  additional 5 percent of  the companies were estimated to  be 
within 5 percent of the base period margin. Overall about one-third of the 
firms were within 15 percent; and about one-half were within 25 percent of 
the base period margin.  Approximately the same percentage  distribution ap- 
pears to hold for Tier IL  firms. 
Not all of the firms with profit margins above the base period level in the 
first quarter are in violation of the regulation. The restriction applies to the 
annual profit margins, and allowances are made for transitory influences  on 
the quarterly reports. Through the middle of August 1972, forty violation 
orders had been issued for Tier I and Tier II firms. 
The major industries that are close to the ceiling are food, tobacco, tex- 
tiles, furniture, chemicals, and transportation. In the case of food and to- 
bacco, this results not from a major cyclical increase in profit margins but 
from the fact that their profit margins are not cyclically sensitive and did 
not decline significantly during the recent recession. 
The Price Commission has revised and tightened some of its rules as ex- 
perience has revealed the need to do so. It required firms to use the com- 
mission's estimates of the trend of productivity growth in their industries 
when it became obvious that the firms' own low estimates were leading 
to consistently large estimated increases in unit labor costs. Second, it has 
refused to allow firms to use wage and benefit increases of more than 5.5 
percent as a justification for a price increase, even when the Pay Board has 
approved the increase. Deferred increases of more than 5.5 percent must be 
passed through on a dollar-for-dollar rather than a percentage basis. This 
should encourage firms to participate actively in wage negotiations rather 
than relying on the Pay Board. Third, it has focused increasingly on the 
industry rather than on the individual firm, and considers many price in- 
crease requests as a package. 
The commission has also expanded its use of such measures as ceilings on 
price increases permitted in certain areas-personal  services, for example. 
This is similar to the procedure in the case of health care services, which has 
proven quite effective. Although there have not at present been large price 
increases for personal services, the commission has been concerned that 
there might be. Markup and margin controls were extended to the food 
processing industry. A  dollar-for-dollar cost pass-through, rather than a 
percentage pass-through, was ordered for the leather industry. The small- 
firm exemption was rescinded in the case of lumber, and the government 
arranged to release more timber acreage from its holdings. Barry Bosworth  375 
SUMMARY 
Unmistakable signs of deceleration of  inflation have appeared during 
Phase II. While the period of analysis is still very short and any firm conclu- 
sions must await the passage of time, the lower rate of wage increase is evi- 
dent in a broad range of measures of wage rates. The same trend toward 
lower rates of inflation is found also on the price side, although the patterns 
are somewhat more divergent. The major improvements are in finished 
goods and medical care services. However, intermediate  goods, public utili- 
ties, and some food  prices have been problem areas. Certain individual 
sectors, such as construction materials, textiles, and leather products, have 
experienced demand  pressures despite  a  general low  level  of  resource 
utilization. 
On the basis of these results it seems quite probable that the program will 
achieve a rate of wage increase near the end of the year of 5.5 to 6.0 percent. 
Price increases are not likely to get down to the target level of 2.5 percent. 
Nonfood commodities, however, appear to be within reach of a 3.0 percent 
rate of increase, though the rate for food prices is highly uncertain. Phase II 
has not brought an end to inflation, but the results thus far should set the 
stage for a tightening of the regulations on both prices and wages in future 
months. 
What these statistics do not prove, however, is that the controls are re- 
sponsible for the improvement. Some may argue that the inflation would in 
any case have slowed down by about the amounit  it has. However, the co- 
incidence of timing seems unusual, to say the least. Two and a half years of 
rising unemployment brought very little slowing of the price and wage in- 
creases; and the kind of general slowing of wage and price increases that 
has taken place in recent months certainly did not occur in the immediate 
precontrol period. 
The major impact on prices and wages does not appear to come from 
specific decisions of the Pay Board or the Price Commission. The actions of 
the  Pay Board in reducing individual contracts account for, at most,  a 
reduction of a couple of tenths of a percentage point in the average of wage 
increases  during Phase 11.  The Price Commlilission  similarly has approved an 
overwhelming proportion of requests for price changes. The restraint ap- 
pears to come instead from the changed environment in which price and 
wage decisions are made-particularly  the published 5.5 percent (or 6.2 
percent) general wage standard. Wage control is effective primarily because 376  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2.1972 
it is in the self-interest  of employers to comply. The lower rate of price infla- 
tion appears to be partly a reflection of a slower increase in wage costs. But 
additional areas of restraint are evident in medical care costs and perhaps 
trade margins. 
Some Operational Problems 
The Phase II controls program has changed considerably since its incep- 
tion. Much of the original rhetoric seemed to indicate that it would be a 
"crunch" program, of relatively short duration, that would quickly restore 
price stability. However, the program as it actually is operating reflects a 
more gradual approach to dampening inflation. After some experience with 
controls, it became clear that a simple freezing of the relative wage and 
price structure as it was in November 1971 would have been inequitable 
and inefficient. The problems in this area were complicated by long con- 
tract periods and lags in decision making in both the labor and the product 
markets. A preference  for gradualism is apparent in the tandem and catch- 
up provisions of the Pay Board and in the cost  pass-through and profit 
margin regulations of the Price Commission. Because of the actions of Con- 
gress, which exempted fringe benefits and raised the wage increase standard 
from 5.5 to 6.2 percent, there may be even more gradualism than was in- 
tended. 
The present program emphasizes restraint primarily in the wage area; 
firms may pass on increases in costs through price increases on a percentage 
basis. Overall this approach may be appealing. Labor costs are by far the 
largest element in the cost of total output, and a permanent slowing of in- 
flation cannot be accomplished without a matching deceleration of wage 
increases. Since profits represent a relatively small percentage of total in- 
come, even a large proportionate reduction in margins would have only a 
relatively small, one-time impact on the rate of inflation. Also it is argued 
that most empirical studies indicate that prices do little more than respond 
to cost increases; aberrations are observed primarily in competitive indus- 
tries that experience large variations in demand and supply. Although the 
situation might be different in a few concentrated industries, these argu- 
ments challenge the need for price controls, except in a few concentrated 
industries, and suggest reliance on the Pay Board for a solution to the in- 
flation problem. Barry Boswvorth  377 
But this singular focus on wages I believe to be the most serious difficulty 
of the current program: Controls can operate in a democratic society only 
in an atmosphere of widespread public confidence. Above all the program 
must maintain  at least the appearance  of equity in its treatment  of all groups. 
It would be hard  to imagine calling out the National Guard to force workers 
back to work. A system where the government, rather  than the employer, is 
the principal  negotiator with employees is not likely to be viable. Unions are 
asked to adhere strictly to the terms of contracts in order to prevent wildcat 
strikes and other disruptive practices. But this will be difficult to do if the 
government is constantly in the position of invalidating contracts that have 
been signed voluntarily by both parties. 
Furthermore, attention has been directed to the large wage increases that 
were obtained by workers in some sectors prior to controls; but equally 
impressive is the willingness of firms to pay them. This is to some extent 
the result of a growing awareness on the part of firms that it is not the ab- 
solute size of the wage increase that matters, but rather its size relative to 
what the firms' competitors will pay. Assurances that these wage rates will 
be the pattern for the rest of the industry allow the firm to pass on the costs 
through a price increase and leave it in the same competitive position as 
before. If imports become a problem, the industry will look to Congress for 
more protectionist measures. 
There is some evidence at present that the size of  wage increases re- 
quested of the Pay Board is rising rather  than falling. Individual firms have 
great incentives to surrender their bargaining function to the Pay Board 
and seek relief from the resulting cost increases by appealing to the Price 
Commission. Wage restraint is an important part of a controls program; 
but it must be balanced by an equally restrictive  policy on price increases in 
order to insure that the government does not simply replace the employer 
as the bargaining agent. 
Finally, the poor performance of productivity in recent years has con- 
tributed to inflation. Though the economist may stress the role of capital 
and technological change in this area, the role of the entrepreneur is fre- 
quently overlooked. Costs are not an exogenous variable to the firm. The 
businessman receives a profit in return  for achieving more efficient methods 
of production. But, for firms with a strong market position, raising prices 
is an easier way than cutting costs to  achieve satisfactory profits. Thus 
excessive market power may reveal itself more in a careless approach to 
controlling costs than in high profits. 378  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
It would appear that a viable program must place a heavy emphasis on 
reinforcing market pressures against price increases. This is necessary to 
induce firms to direct more effort toward reducing  their costs as a means of 
increasing profits. The government's role in labor negotiations must be 
largely the indirect one of stiffening business resistance to excessive wage 
increases. In individual cases direct action may be needed to prevent the 
kind of large wage increase in a specific sector that can stimulate another 
round of wage inflation. 
The regulation adopted by the Price Commission after the coal settle- 
ment, which does not allow a price adjustment to cover a wage increase in 
excess of 5.5 percent, is in concept a step in this direction. It strengthens  the 
employer's concern with the original wage settlement, since an agreenment 
on a wage increase may not be cut back by the Pay Board and the firm may 
be forced to cover the cost increase out of profits. But in practice most of 
this restraint  is lost because of the looseness of the cost pass-through regu- 
lation. Firms can cover the excess wage increase by raising the estimate of 
other components of total costs. 
PRICE  CONTROLS 
In adopting a program of price controls, as in wage controls, government 
decision making need not supplant that of the market participants. The 
controls should reinforce the basic pressures of the market. Yet current 
price controls appear to be inconsistent with this objective. 
I take as a general model of the pricing behavior of a competitive firm 
one in which it charges a price that represents a markup over its marginal 
costs. This markup should be a function of the price sensitivity, or elasticity 
of demand, the individual firm faces. The formal economic statement of the 
price that maximizes profits is given by 
p=  e  .MC, 
e-1 
where P equals price, e equals the elasticity of demand, and MC equals 
marginal costs. Thus a firm in a perfectly competitive market with a de- 
mand elasticity of infinity will have its price equal to marginal costs, and 
no rational firm will purposely sell in the inelastic portion of its demand 
curve. In practice, the demand elasticity of differentiated products will lie 
between these extremes; and empirical studies have indicated that the mar- Barry Bosworth  379 
ginal costs of most industries are constant over a fairly wide range of out- 
put. Thus the businessman's concept of direct unit costs is a close approxi- 
mation of marginal costs. The firm may set its markups more by trial and 
error or on the basis of historical experience, but market pressures  will lead 
the  successful firms toward the  profit-maximizing price defined above. 
Markups will not change greatly unless there are substantial changes in 
competitive structures over time. 
The important issue for price controls is the emphasis, in normal pricing 
decisions, placed on marginal or direct unit costs rather than on average 
total costs. But the current  cost pass-through regulations for manufacturers 
stress the latter rather than the former concept. The regulation does not 
have a valid economic rationale, nor does it reflect the pricing practice of 
most firms. The procedure  is in contrast to the regulations for the trade sec- 
tor, which stress marginal or invoice costs, rather than total costs. 
In practice, the regulation is so difficult to administer as to be unwork- 
able for manufacturers.  Any decision on allocating the joint operating costs 
and overhead costs of multiproduct  firms  is so arbitrary  as to give individual 
firms wide discretion in their  justification of price increases. Once the Price 
Commission becomes entangled in the web of accounting problems involved 
in dealing with an individual firm, it is at a severe disadvantage, for it will 
never understand the firm's operations as well as the firm's own managers 
do. Since the regulation is oriented toward the individual firm rather than 
the market, the commission has difficulty in verifying cost increases using 
existing government data. In contrast, a firm's direct costs are mainly those 
of wages and materials, for which government data, wage agreements, and 
invoices provide a significant amount of information on an industry-wide 
basis. 
The term limit pricing agreements were part of an attempt to reduce the 
administrative  burden of the controls. Individual firms agreed to hold their 
average price increases to about 2 percent, with a maximum of 6 percent 
for an individual product line. These firms also remain subject to the profit 
margin restriction. 
The result of the regulation, however, has been to release firms with high 
productivity growth (which might have been pressed for price reductions) 
from the controls. It has also given these firms a high degree of price flexi- 
bility. They can raise prices on products in which they have significant mar- 
ket power and leave prices unchanged in the competitive areas. The TLPs 
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was made to negotiate the average  size of the increases.  They averaged  2 per- 
cent. But average price increases in some industries should have been held 
close to zero. In other industries with large potential cost increases, even 
price increases far above 2 percent would represent substantial restraint. 
Both the complexities of applying the cost pass-through regulations and 
the broad area covered by price controls create a heavy administrative  bur- 
den that distorts the focus of the program. These problems have forced the 
commission to rely on the profit margin restriction as a primary means of 
control, rather than as a secondary line of defense, as was originally in- 
tended. In effect this is simply another way of looking at total costs. Both 
regulations are equivalent to an excess profits tax, with the difference that 
the excess profits are to be paid to the consumer rather  than to the govern- 
ment. Thus they are subject to all the early criticisms of the use of this tax. 
In addition, it is difficult to see how the change in an individual firm's 
profit  margin since 1968-69 can be correlated  closely with the need for price 
increases or reductions in the markets in which it operates. The fact that a 
firm's profits have been reduced by cost increases  does not necessarily  mean 
that its prices should be raised. The emphasis should be placed first on cost 
reductions. In addition, profit margins will be strongly affected by cyclical 
fluctuations in sales and in the mix of products sold. 
The current  regulations appear to encourage firms to let costs rise so that 
they  may raise prices and  receive an equivalent percentage increase in 
profits. Incentives toward price collusion are strengthened.  The regulations 
lead to abnormalities; for example, firms do not fund short-term debt into 
long-term because the former is an allowable cost and the latter is not. On 
the profit side, interest on borrowed capital is not part of profits, but the 
return on a firm's own capital is. Maintenance and other activities of a 
semi-investment nature can be accelerated while the Price Commission is 
in existence, with the consequent shifting of profits into the future in antici- 
pation of its demise. 
Given the commitment to do so, what is the proper way to regulate pric- 
ing decisions? I would prefer the type of regulation that strengthens the 
basic market pressure  on prices, rather than one that attempts to supplant 
the market mechanism. If the commission focused on direct labor costs 
(with estimates of productivity growth in the industry) and materials costs, 
and ignored overhead costs, it would have a more meaningful basis for 
evaluating requests for price increases. The controls could then be directed 
toward markets rather  than toward individual firms as a means of strength- Barry Boswortlz  381 
ening incentives for cost reductions. Measuring profits is useful primarily 
as an ex post means for determining areas of the economy in which the 
commission has been too rough or too easy. 
Accounting complexities would remain even with these modifications. 
Without extensive administrative machinery, no system of comprehensive 
price controls can be managed effectively. The very complexity of the issues 
involved sharpens the need to focus the efforts of the Price Commission on 
the more significant industries  where it will have an important impact. 
Exempting firms with sixty or fewer employees did substantially reduce 
the coverage of the program since it affected about 5 million firms with 19 
million employees and $500 billion in sales. But most of the commission's 
administrative activities are associated with the  1,500 Tier I firms which 
account for 30 percent of total sales. The Internal Revenue Service also has 
a heavy burden in monitoring Tier It firms though this has little impact on 
the price level. 
One of the difficulties  with redefining  the size of Tier I firms so as to ex- 
ercise better control is that there is little connection between firm size and 
the likelihood that controls will be constructive. Firm size does not indicate 
accurately either market power or industries in which controls can be most 
effective. The fields of health services and construction are examples of this 
type of problem. A more adequate definition of problem industries  than one 
based on firm size is needed if the dimensions of the category are to be re- 
duced. One possibility is to  make the definition a flexible one in which 
firms are moved in and out of Tier I as pricing problems develop in their 
industry. 
WAGE  CONTROLS 
Wage controls appear to impose far fewer administrative problems than 
do price controls. The Pay Board regulations have not required  the kind of 
large bureaucracy that developed in the Price Commission.  Part of  the 
reason is that one of the private parties involved in wage regulations-the 
employer-is  normally interested in their enforcement. The Price Conmmis- 
sion has no such advantage. Wage controls, however, do involve complex 
issues of relative wage differentials. In the absence of controls, wages are 
not determined purely by the interaction of demand and supply but are 
heavily influenced by the relative market power of the employer and em- 
ployee. The Pay Board has been given no clear standards to guide it in de- 382  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
termining the "correct" relative wages of different  groups. It is thus frozen 
into maintaining the existing wage structure, which will not be accepted by 
all. Alternatively, the issue of what constitutes a "fair" wage also creates 
the risk that the Pay Board will become a tool for income redistribution; 
but while a redistribution of income might be a desirable objective, a pay 
board would probably not be the best means for accomplishing it. 
The requirement of the stabilization act that the board take account of 
"productivity bargaining" in its decisions is fraught with similar dangers. 
If a few of the less responsible unions try to use old work rules as a means 
of achieving larger wage increases, others must in self-defense follow suit. 
Unions that previously displayed a flexible attitude in allowing manage- 
ment to vary work patterns will use such rules changes as a device for ex- 
ceeding the general wage standard. Except in isolated instances the buying 
out of restrictive work rules is not a good practice. 
Many of the problems associated with wage controls have not yet de- 
veloped in the United States because of excessive slack in the labor market. 
But the problems will intensify as the expansion continues. In contrast to 
this year, 1973 will be a year of extensive collective bargaining activity. 
Many major union contracts will come before the Pay Board, and excep- 
tions to the general standard will become less easy to justify because of the 
declining importance of the catchup and tandem provisions of the current 
regulations. The general standard was raised to an effective rate of 6.2 per- 
cent by the action of Congress in exempting many fringe benefits and will 
obviously have to  be tightened. But such restriction will be difficult to 
achieve until a better performance of consumer prices can be achieved. 
Conclusion 
Price and wage controls have not as yet been the unmitigated disaster 
that some predicted they would be. Nor have they been a panacea for all 
our ills. As with most things in life, they have been a mixed bag. The evi- 
dence presented here as to their impact is highly tentative. Because there 
are problems now, and more will probably develop in the future, the pro- 
gram will need to be continuously revised to meet changing conditions. The 
inability to hold to an acceptable rate of inflation at an acceptable level of 
unemployment can be interpreted as a need to change the system. Wage 
and price controls are an extreme form of such change. Our own past ex- Barry Bosworth  383 
perience, and that of other countries, strongly implies that they are not a 
permanent solution, but they give us time to undertake more fundamental 
corrections. 
It is discouraging to find so little evidence of serious planning for a Phase 
III period for restructuring  problem industries.  The government could play 
a significant role in cooperating with labor and business to moderate the 
pressures that develop in specific sectors of the economy and to improve 
their ability to adjust to these pressures  without major price increases.  This 
role may call for changes in import controls, the occasional use of govern- 
ment stockpiles, subsidies, and support prices as a means of stabilizing in- 
dividual markets, and a change in laws that interfere  with the smooth trans- 
fer of resources among sectors. A multitude of proposals have already been 
made for upgrading the quality and mobility of labor. Similar improve- 
ments could be made in the product markets to  strengthen competitive 
pressures  and to promote efficiency. I doubt that these measures are as di- 
rect as breaking up large firms and large unions, but the government need 
not limit itself to reviewing  passively  the price and wage increases submitted 
to it. 
Price and wage controls are not generally popular among economists. 
Certainly they are anathema to the type of economy outlined in the text- 
books. But the correspondence between the static world of the textbook 
and the real world we live in is sometimes itself difficult to discern. The 
realities dictate that there can be no sharp line of demarcation between the 
private and the public sectors. Private decisions must have some regard for 
their larger implications. It may be possible to alter the economic structure 
so that externalities are adequately reflected in private decisions, but this 
will take time. In the meantime, government participation  in wage and price 
decisions need not mean the end of the free market economy. There is no 
need for a pervasive system of government control, but there is a need to 
recognize that different  sectors of the economy have different  characteristics 
and as such require different public policies. If some progress in reducing 
inflation was a  political prerequisite for redirecting fiscal and monetary 
policy toward reducing unemployment, the controls have thus far been a 
cheap price to pay. 